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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effects on economic growth attributable to government policies 
of child allowances and educational subsidies. We show that multiple steady states may 
arise under these two policies, with club convergence occurring, and the initial condition 
being of relevance, if the tax rate is fairly high. Under a policy of child allowances, an 
increase in the tax rate is found to raise the quantity of children, but lower the quality of 
adults; however, under a policy of educational subsidies, with an increase in the tax rate, 
corresponding increases are found in both the quantity of children and the quality of 
adults. We also find that considering the ‘threshold’ effects of technological externalities, 
an economy can escape the poverty trap if the threshold is sufficiently low. For developed 
countries, introducing child allowances may improve or hurt the welfare while 
introducing educational subsidies is welfare improving. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Child allowances and educational subsidies have become popular governmental policies 
over recent decades, with such need for government intervention occurring when the 
competitive economy fails to attain certain important social goals. Over the course of 
development, there has been a steady decline in fertility in many countries, leading to 
concerns over the sustainability of social welfare systems. On the one hand, the external 
effects of children attributable to intra-generational transfers, such as ‘pay-as-you-go’ 
social security systems, have led to the fertility choices made by individuals falling 
below the social optimum, thereby giving rise to incentives for governments to provide 
child allowances in order to raise the fertility rate (van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam, 
2003). On the other hand, as a result of the recognition of human capital accumulation 
as an important engine for growth, in most of the developed nations, not only are there 
public schooling provisions in place for basic education, but also significant subsidies 
for higher education. 
In this paper, we focus on these trends in our examination of the effects on 
economic growth attributable to the adoption of policies of child allowances and 
educational subsidies based on an overlapping-generations (OLG) model. We are 
particularly interested in the ways in which these two policies affect economic growth 
through the channel of population structure, such as the quality and quantity of the labor 
force. Within the considerable number of prior studies on endogenous fertility, there 
has been a general tendency to adopt the idea originally proposed by Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura (1990), that the decisions of parents are taken on the basis of both the 
quantity and quality of their children. Under such a setting, there is no social inter-
group mobility, since the children of skilled parents remain skilled and those of 
unskilled parents remain unskilled (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003, 2004); as such, the 
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fertility choices of skilled and unskilled parents in the current period will clearly 
determine the future composition of the labor market. 
Different from the prior studies, in the present study we assume that adults make 
the decision on the pursuit of higher education. There are two types of workers in the 
present study, with those agents receiving (not receiving) higher education being 
referred to as skilled (unskilled) workers. Besides decision on education, adults also 
need to make decisions on consumption and fertility; that is, adults need to allocate 
their time between education, raising children and working, with changes in fiscal 
policies consequently having immediate impacts on the composition of the labor 
market. Policies such as the provision of child allowances or educational subsidies 
which increase the amount of time spent on raising children or on the accumulation of 
skills may reduce the amount of time available for working, with a corresponding 
reduction in savings. Within the prior studies based on OLG models, there has been a 
tendency to separate schooling and working time by assuming that agents accumulate 
human capital (skills) and work during different periods, thereby ignoring the fact that in 
order to pursue higher education, agents must sacrifice their working time. We therefore 
complement the extant literature in the present study by allowing adults to make decisions 
on the allocation of their time between working and skills accumulation.  
Over the postwar period, there are large increases in the relative quantity of 
skilled labor and the skill premium in U.S. and one explanation of this phenomenon is 
the increase in the demand for skilled workers due to skill-biased technological 
changes.1 The empirical study of Krusell, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) demonstrates 
that in addition to low-wage foreign labor, unskilled labor would also compete with 
cheaper and better capital equipment; we therefore assume that when producing 
                                                 
1   See Davis and Haltwanger (1991), Krueger (1993) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998). 
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output, physical capital and skilled labor are more complementary than physical 
capital and unskilled labor.2 The complementarity that exists between capital and 
skilled workers is a novel introduction to the current literature on the analysis of child 
allowance and educational subsidy policies. Such complementarity between capital 
and skilled labor in the production function plays an important role in our model, 
essentially because it changes the concave property of the law of motion of capital per 
worker, with the potential for the existence of multiple stable steady states. 
For a poor economy, where skilled workers and unskilled workers coexist, with 
an increase in capital, there will be a corresponding increase in the proportion of 
skilled workers within the working population through the complementarity between 
capital and skills. This leads to low fertility and high savings, both of which are 
beneficial to capital accumulation. Therefore, the decreasing returns to capital can be 
overcome as a result of the complementarity between capital and skills, and thus, the 
law of motion of capital per worker is convex. Conversely, for a rich economy, where 
only skilled workers exist, there will be decreasing returns to capital, and the law of 
motion of capital per worker will be concave. Multiple stable steady states may 
therefore occur as a result of the convex-concave combination of the law of motion of 
capital per worker. 
In order to provide child allowances and educational subsidies, government 
levies progressive income tax. These governmental policies would affect agents’ 
decisions with regard to fertility, savings and the accumulation of skills, and would 
therefore also affect long-run economic growth. In conjunction with the 
complementarity between capital and skilled workers within the production function, 
                                                 
2   Studies of Katz and Murphy (1992) and Goldin and Katz (1998) also demonstrate that physical 
capital and skilled labor are more complementary than physical capital and unskilled labor. Griliches 
(1969) provides an early analysis of the complementarity of physical capital and skills. 
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the choices on fertility and skills generate a convex-concave combination of the law 
of motion of capital per worker. 3  
We find that in an economy with child allowances, a higher tax rate will bring 
about a quantity-quality trade-off within the population, essentially because it will 
increase the quantity of children, whereas it will reduce the average educational level 
within society as a whole. The aggregate savings rate will be reduced, which in turn, 
will lead to a reduction in the accumulation of capital per worker; such a scenario is 
obviously detrimental to economic growth. 
When a government provides educational subsidies, there will be a general 
increase in both the quantity of children and the quality of adults; nevertheless, with 
increases in the amount of time spent on education and raising children, there will be 
a corresponding reduction in working time. Despite the fact that this would raise the 
overall quality of adults, the aggregate savings rate would be reduced with the tax rate 
as a result of the lower savings of skilled workers; such lower aggregate savings 
would, in turn, further reduce capital accumulation and economic growth. 
Our results indicate that under both scenarios, multiple stable non-trivial steady 
states may occur, depending on the magnitude of the tax rate. A fairly high tax rate 
may generate club convergence, and thus, the initial condition would be of relevance; 
those countries starting from high initial levels of capital per worker would converge 
to a ‘good’ steady state, whereas others starting from low initial values of capital per 
worker would remain trapped in poverty. If the tax rate was sufficiently low (high), 
there would be a unique, stable steady state, with the economy converging to a ‘good’ 
(‘bad’) steady state, irrespective of the state at which it started. Technological 
progress can help those countries locked in the poverty trap to liberate their 
                                                 
3   The approach adopted in this study is closely related to that of Galor and Weil (1996) who analyze 
the relationship between the gender gap, fertility and growth based upon a similar shape of the law of 
motion of capital per worker.  
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economies. With the ‘threshold’ effects on the technology externalities, a sufficiently 
low threshold can help the economy get out of the poverty trap. However, club 
convergence would still occur if the threshold was sufficiently high. 
This study therefore contributes to the extant literature on the poverty trap by 
demonstrating that multiple stable steady states may occur under a scenario of an 
economy where provisions are in place for child allowances or educational subsidies. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel finding within the related literature.  
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) have shown that endogenizing fertility choice 
and the degree of altruism can generate non-ergodic growth while Galor and Tsiddon 
(1997) have shown that multiple stable steady states can easily emerge in a model 
with human capital accumulation which depends on the home and global externalities. 
But none of these studies raises policy issues.  
It is already well known that increases in child allowances will raise fertility and 
impede economic growth due to the ‘capital-dilution’ effect (van Groezen, Leers and 
Meijdam, 2003; van Groezen and Meijdam, 2008). The possibility of child allowances 
causing multiple equilibria has been examined by the more recent studies. For 
example, Fanti and Gori (2012) find that if the amount of child allowances provided is 
higher than the costs attributable to raising children, then the provision of child 
allowances will cause two positive steady states; however, in their study, the 
concavity of the law of motion of capital per worker remains invariable, and as a 
result, only one of the positive steady states is stable, while the other is unstable. Their 
result is therefore unable to explain the phenomenon of the non-convergence of 
economic growth found in the prior empirical studies. 
A more surprising finding in the present study is that increases in educational 
subsidies will hamper economic growth. Ever since the seminal work of Lucas (1988), 
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it has been generally recognized within the related studies that human capital 
accumulation is an important determinant of economic growth; therefore, any policies 
which are beneficial to human capital accumulation, such as educational subsidies or 
public schooling, should encourage economic growth.4 Our finding that an increase in 
educational subsidies will hinder economic growth is due to three reasons. First, a 
higher income tax rate will lower the motivation of being skilled workers; second, the 
increased time spent on education and raising children will result in less time being 
available for working; and third, an increase in the average fertility rate will give rise 
to a capital-dilution effect, ultimately reducing the total capital per worker. 
Even though introducing child allowances or educational subsidies may reduce 
consumption and savings, it does not necessarily imply that the introduction of the 
policy hurts welfare since fertility may increase. Regarding welfare, we find that for 
developed countries, introducing educational subsidies is welfare improving while 
introducing child allowances may improve or hurt the welfare, depending on how fertility 
responses to the policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A description of the 
economic environment is provided in Section 2. This is followed in Section 3 by 
analysis of the economy with the provision of child allowances, and subsequently in 
Section 4, by a similar analysis of the economy with the provision of educational 
subsidies. A comparison of the two policies is then carried out in Section 5. Finally, 
the conclusions drawn from this study are presented in Section 6. 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete time overlapping generations model where 
agents live for three periods - childhood, adulthood (parenthood), and old age. All 
                                                 
4    See Glomm (1997), Chen (2005) and Chen and Azariadis (2013).  
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decisions are made in adulthood, with adults also deciding whether or not to receive 
higher education to become skilled workers (ݏ) or unskilled workers (ݑ).  
2.1  Households 
Adults in period t care about the number of children ( ݊௧௜ ) and their old-age 
consumption (ܿ௧ାଵ௜ ), where i represents the type of agents. The utility function, which 
is identical for all agents, is defined as: 
                                                ݑ௧௜ ൌ ln݊௧௜ ൅ ߚlnܿ௧ାଵ௜ ,													݅ ൌ ݏ, ݑ,                           (1) 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the discount factor. 
In each period, agents are endowed with one unit of time. Adults need to work to 
earn the wages (ݓ௧௜). In addition to working, adults also need to choose to spend how 
much time on raising children (ݖ௧௜ ) and to acquire higher education or not.5  We 
assume that it takes a fixed proportion (ߪ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ) of time for each adult to acquire 
higher education to become a skilled worker. 
Raising children requires time cost and resource cost. Fertility is assumed to be 
an increasing function of child allowances (Gt) and time spent on raising children for 
type-i adults;6 that is, 
                                     ݊௧௜ ൌ ݍ൫ݖ௧௜൯ఊሺ1 ൅ ܩ௧ሻଵିఊ,								ݍ ൐ 0,                              (2) 
where ߛ, 1 െ ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ respectively represent the elasticities of fertility with respect 
to time devoted to raising children and child allowances.7 
The government levies progressive income tax in order to provide public 
subsidies for raising children (Gt) or education (Et); for simplicity, it is assumed that 
the tax rate for unskilled workers is zero, while the tax rate imposed on skilled worker 
                                                 
5    The estimates by Cigno and Rosati, (1996) provide support the hypothesis that fertility and saving 
are jointly determined by self-interested agents. 
6   Empirical studies showing a positive effect of child allowances on fertility have been provided by 
Manski and Mayshar (2003), Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007) and Schellekens (2009). 
7   Similar setting of the fertility function can be also found in Momota (2000), Balestrino, Cigno and 
Pettini (2003) and Apps and Rees (2004).  
9 
 
is τ(0,1). Following Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), we assume that educational 
subsidies compensate foregone labor time of skilled workers due to schooling. 
Therefore, educational subsidies are assumed to be proportional to the wage loss; that 
is, ܧ௧ ൌ ݃ߪݓ௧௦, where ݃ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. Savings (ܽ௧௜ ) for skilled workers are therefore: 
                                  ܽ௧௦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪ െ ݖ௧௦ሻݓ௧௦ ൅ ܧ௧.                                   (3) 
If adults decide not to acquire higher education, they become unskilled workers 
and face with the following budget constraint: 
     ܽ௧௨ ൌ ሺ1െݖ௧௨ሻݓ௧௨.                                                  (4) 
The budget constraint for an old agent is therefore:     
                                         ܿ௧ାଵ௜ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵܽ௧ାଵ௜ ,							݅ ൌ ݏ, ݑ,                                       (5) 
where ܴ௧ାଵ is the gross rate of return of savings. 
The total population of workers (adults) in period t is denoted by Nt. Let ܮ௧௦ 
denote skilled labor, and ܮ௧௨  denote unskilled labor, with the respective ratios of 
skilled and unskilled workers to the adult population being represented by ߶௧  and 
(1 െ ߶௧ ); thus, skilled labor is ܮ௧௦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߪ െ ݖ௧௦ሻ߶௧ ௧ܰ  and unskilled labor is ܮ௧௨ ൌ
ሺ1െݖ௧௨ሻሺ1 െ ߶௧ሻ ௧ܰ . We assume that the government runs a balanced budget, and 
given that the tax revenue is used to provide subsidies for raising children (child 
allowances) or for providing education, this implies that: 
                                             ܩ௧ ௧ܰ ൌ ߜ߬ݓ௧௦ܮ௧௦,                                                     (6a) 
                                        	ܧ௧߶௧ ௧ܰ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ߬ݓ௧௦ܮ௧௦,                                           (6b) 
where ߜ ൌ 0, 1. 
2.2  Production 
Output is produced, using physical capital (Kt), skilled labor and unskilled labor, 
based upon the following production function: 
                                        ௧ܻ ൌ ܣሾܭ௧ఈሺܮ௧௦ሻଵିఈ ൅ ܾܮ௧௨ሿ,				ܣ, ܾ ൐ 0.                                 (7) 
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Eq. (7) indicates that there is greater complementarity between skilled labor and 
capital than between unskilled labor and capital.8 Let ݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧/ ௧ܰ represent capital per 
worker. The gross rate of the return on capital and the real wage rates of skilled labor 
(ݓ௧௦) and unskilled labor (ݓ௧௨) are: 
																																																				ܴ௧ ൌ ܣߙ ቈ ݇௧ሺ1 െ ߪ െ ݖ௧௦ሻ߶௧቉
ఈିଵ
,																																				ሺ8ሻ 
																																															ݓ௧௦ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቈ ݇௧ሺ1 െ ߪ െ ݖ௧௦ሻ߶௧቉
ఈ
,																																		ሺ9ሻ 
                                               ݓ௧௨ ൌ ܣܾ.                                                    (10) 
Eqs. (8) and (9) imply that the ratio of the wage rate of unskilled workers to that 
of skilled workers (߭௧) is: 
																																									߭௧ ൌ ݓ௧
௨
ݓ௧௦ ൌ
ܾ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ ݇௧ሺ1 െ ߪ െ ݖ௧௦ሻ߶௧൨
ఈ 	.																															ሺ11ሻ 
2.3  Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of the economy is defined as follows. Given the initial level of capital 
per worker (݇଴), the fiscal policy and the factor prices ሼܴ௧, ݓ௧௦, ݓ௧௨ሽ, an equilibrium 
comprises of sequences of aggregate physical capital {ܭ௧}, working population { ௧ܰ} 
and households’ decision rules ൛ܽ௧௜ , ݖ௧௜, ܿ௧ାଵ௜ ൟ, ݅ ൌ ݏ, ݑ, such that: 
1. Given the factor prices and the fiscal policy, skilled and unskilled workers will 
make their decisions by maximizing their utility subject to budget constraints; 
2. The factor price equations, Eqs. (8)-(10), hold;  
3.     The markets clear; 
4.     The government runs a balanced budget; 
5.     Fertility is governed by Eq. (2). 
3.  CHILD ALLOWANCES 
                                                 
8   This type of production is also adopted by Galor and Weil (1996), Kimura and Yasui (2007), Chen 
(2010) and Azariadis and Chen (2013). 
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We first consider an economy where the government provides child allowances; that 
is, ߜ ൌ 1. Skilled workers will maximize Eq. (1), subject to Eqs. (2), (3) and (5). The 
optimal choices of ݖ௧௦ and ݏ௧௦ are: 
																																																																	ݖ௧௦ ൌ ߛሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚ ,																																																					ሺ12ሻ 
																																																						ܽ௧௦ ൌ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻݓ௧
௦
ߛ ൅ ߚ .																																												ሺ13ሻ 
Similarly, unskilled workers will maximize Eq. (1) subject to Eqs. (2), (4) and 
(5). The optimal decisions of ݖ௧௨ and ݏ௧௨ are: 
																																																																		ݖ௧௨ ൌ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ,																																																										ሺ14ሻ 
																																																																	ܽ௧௨ ൌ ߚݓ௧
௨
ߛ ൅ ߚ.																																																											ሺ15ሻ 
Note that ݖ௧௦ ൏ ݖ௧௨ . This is because the opportunity cost of raising children is 
higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers and skilled workers will spend 
less time raising children.  
Based on the government budget constraint, Eq. (6a), the amount of children 
allowances received by each adult is: 
																																																																			ܩ௧ ൌ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈ߶௧ଵିఈ,																																																	ሺ16ሻ 
where ߦ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቂሺଵିఙሻఉఊାఉ ቃ
ଵିఈ
. The fertility of skilled and unskilled workers can be 
derived by substituting Eq. (16) and the optimal choice of ݖ௧௦  and ݖ௧௨  into Eq. (2). 
Based on Eq. (2), skilled workers will have fewer children than unskilled workers. 
All workers are freely mobile between the skilled and unskilled labor markets, 
and thus, at equilibrium, they will be indifferent between becoming skilled or 
unskilled workers; that is, ݑ௧௦ ൌ ݑ௧௨. Plugging the optimal decisions on consumption 
and fertility into the utility functions for skilled and unskilled workers, we can obtain 
the ratio of the wage rate of unskilled workers to that of skilled workers, which is 
expressed as: 
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																																																					߭௧ ൌ ݓ௧
௨
ݓ௧௦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ଵାఊఉ.																																			ሺ17ሻ 
Combining Eqs. (11) and (17), we obtain the ratio of skilled workers to the adult 
population, which depends on ߬ and  ݇௧, as follows: 
                                              ߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧,																																																					ሺ18ሻ 
where ߟሺ߬ሻ ൌ ఈାఉఉ ൤
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఛሻ
௕ ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ଵିఈାംഁ൨
భ
ഀ
 and ߟᇱሺ߬ሻ ൏ 0. 
Since income tax is only levied on skilled workers, Eq. (18) indicates that an 
increase in the tax rate will lower the ratio of the population of skilled workers to the 
adult population. We use ത݇ denote the value that ߶௧ reaches its upper bound, 1; that is, 
߶൫߬, ത݇൯ ൌ 1. From Eq. (18), we have: 
ത݇ሺ߬ሻ ൌ 1ߟሺ߬ሻ		. 
This indicates that an increase in the tax rate will raise ത݇. Then we have: 
                                        ߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ቊߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧1 					if				
݇௧ ൏ ത݇	
݇௧ ൒ ത݇	.                              (19) 
Using Eq. (19) and fertility choices of skilled and unskilled workers, the average 
fertility rate of the economy (݉௧) can be calculated as: 
              ݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ݊௧௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻሻ݊௧௨ 
                                ൌ ݍሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈ߶௧ଵିఈሻଵିஓ ቀ ఊఊାఉቁ
ఊ ሾ1 െ ߪ෤߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻሿ,																					ሺ20ሻ 
where ߪ෤ ൌ 1 െ ሺ1 െ ߪሻఊ, with 0 ൏ ߪ෤ ൏ 1. 
Combining Eqs. (16), (19) and (20), the average fertility is expressed as: 
݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ 																																					
ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓݍሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿଵିஓ ൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
ሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿ
ݍሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻଵିఊ ቈ
ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ
ߛ ൅ ߚ ቉
ఊ 					if					݇௧ ൏ ത݇	݇௧ ൒ ത݇	.																								ሺ21ሻ 
We then obtain the following results. 
Proposition 1.  In an economy with child allowances, an increase in the tax rate 
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will raise the average fertility rate of the economy if ߬ ൏ ߙ. 
Proof:   See Appendix A. 
If ݇௧ ൏ ത݇, then tax rate will affect the average fertility through two channels, the 
ratio of the population of skilled workers to the adult population and the amount of 
child allowances. Since only skilled workers need to pay the income tax, an increase 
in the tax rate will lower the ratio of the population of skilled workers to the adult 
population. Although an increase in the tax rate raises the contribution of tax revenue, 
the lower ratio of the population of skilled workers to the adult population reduces the 
tax base. If the tax rate is low enough such that ߬ ൏ ߙ, the ratio of the population of 
skilled workers to the adult population will not decrease too much and the first effect 
will dominate the second effect, leading to an increase in the amount of child 
allowances. This resultant increase in child allowances will in turn raise the average 
fertility. Besides, with more adults choosing to become unskilled workers, the average 
fertility rate will increase even further, since unskilled workers will have higher 
fertility rate than skilled workers. Based upon annual US time-series data, Krusell, 
Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) show that between 1963 and 1990, the share of 
aggregate income attributable to labor was about 70%. Since in our paper, the tax 
revenue is only used to provide child allowances or educational subsidies, it is 
reasonable to assume that ߬ ൏ ߙ. If ݇௧ ൒ ത݇, an increase in the tax rate will raise the 
amount of child allowances, leaving the ratio of the population of skilled workers to 
the adult population equal to one. Therefore, the average fertility will increase.  
3.1  Dynamics 
We are now ready to study the dynamic properties of the economy. The clearing 
condition of the capital market implies that: 
                                         ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾ߶௧ݏ௧௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶௧ሻݏ௧௨ሿ ௧ܰ, 
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with this equation then being rewritten in terms of capital per worker as: 
																																					݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܭ௧ାଵ௧ܰାଵ ൌ
ܭ௧ାଵ
݉௧ ௧ܰ ൌ
ሾ߶௧ݏ௧௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶௧ሻݏ௧௨ሿ
݉௧ 	.																							ሺ22ሻ 
Using Eqs. (9), (10), (13) and (15) to substitute wage rates and savings in Eq. 
(22), we obtain the law of motion of capital per worker within the economy as: 
																																						݇௧ାଵ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦ݇௧ఈ߶௧ଵିఈ ൅ ܣߚܾߛ ൅ ߚ ሺ1 െ ߶௧ሻ
݉௧ 	.																											ሺ23ሻ 
Substitute ߶௧ and ݉௧ in Eq. (23) by using Eqs. (19) and (21) to, the law of motion of 
capital per worker becomes: 
                              ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ቊ ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ					if				
݇௧ ൏ ത݇	
݇௧ ൒ ത݇	,                         (24) 
where 
																							 ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ
ܣߚܾ
ሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ൜1 ൅ ߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ 1൨ ݇௧ൠ
ݍሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿଵିఊሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿ 	.																ሺ25ሻ 
and 
																																										 ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦ݇௧
ఈ
ݍ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛߛ ൅ ߚ ൨
ఊ
ሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻଵିఊ
	.																											ሺ26ሻ 
In order to analyze dynamic behavior of the economy with the provision of child 
allowances, we make the following restriction with regard to ߬. 
Assumption 1. In an economy with child allowances, the tax rate is small enough 
such that ߬ ൏ minሼߙ, ߬̅ሽ, where ߬̅ ൌ ఙ෥
ఙ෥ାಲഁ್ംశഁሺଵିఙሻ
షംഁ
.9 
Appendix B shows that under assumption 1, ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ   is convex in ݇௧  and 
ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is a concave function in ݇௧. Finally, we have: 
																															 ଵ݂ሺ߬, 0ሻ ൌ ܣߚܾݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ൐ 0,					 lim௞೟→ஶ
߲ ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲݇௧ ൌ 0.															ሺ27ሻ 
                                                 
9   The assumption that ߬ ൏ ߬̅ is made in order to determine the shape of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ. See Appendix B. 
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Therefore, we can determine that, if ݇௧ ൏ ത݇, then the law of motion of capital per 
worker is convex,  and if ݇௧ ൒ ത݇, then it becomes concave; together with Eq. (27), this 
implies the existence of a steady state. However, these conditions are not sufficient to 
guarantee the uniqueness of the steady state. There are, at most, three steady states, 
which are referred to as ݇௅∗ , ݇ெ∗  and ݇ு∗ , where ݇௅∗  and ݇ெ∗  are the solutions for 
݇∗ ൌ ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇∗ሻ and ݇ு∗  is the non-trivial solution for ݇∗ ൌ ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇∗ሻ, with ݇௅∗ ൏ ݇ெ∗ ൏
݇ு∗ . Note that both skilled and unskilled workers exist in the economy at ݇௅∗, whereas 
the economy comprises of only skilled workers at ݇ு∗ . 
As regards the dynamic behavior of the economy, there are three possible 
situations. If  ݂൫߬, ത݇൯ ൐ ത݇ and ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൐ ݇௧ for all ݇௧ ൏ ത݇, then there will be a unique, 
stable steady state, ݇ு∗ , and the economy will converge to a high level of steady state, 
݇ு∗ , regardless of its initial condition (see ݂ሺ߬஺, ݇௧ሻ in Figure 1). 
<Figure 1 is inserted about here> 
In Figure 1, ݂ሺ߬஻, ݇௧ሻ describes the dynamic system of the economy for the case 
where ݂൫߬, ത݇൯ ൐ ത݇ and there exists ݇௧ ൏ ത݇ such that ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൏ ݇௧. In this case, there 
are multiple steady states (݇௅∗, ݇ெ∗  and ݇ு∗ ) (see ݂ሺ߬஼, ݇௧ሻ in Figure 1). Of these three 
steady states, ݇௅∗  and ݇ு∗  are stable, whilst ݇ெ∗  is unstable; as a result, club 
convergence occurs and the initial value of capital per worker matters. If ݇଴ ൏ ݇ெ∗ , the 
economy will converge to an underdevelopment trap (݇௅∗) with the coexistence of 
skilled and unskilled workers. On the other hand, if ݇଴ ൐ ݇ெ∗ , the economy will 
converge to a high level of capital per worker (݇ு∗ ) where only skilled workers will 
exist. If ݂൫߬, ത݇൯ ൏ ത݇ , there will be a unique steady state (݇௅∗ ). The economy will 
converge to this steady state and be trapped in poverty no matter where it starts (see 
݂ሺ߬஽, ݇௧ሻ in Figure 1).   
3.2  Effects of the tax rate  
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We go on to examine the effects of the tax rate on the economic behavior in this sub-
section. First, we note that with an increase in the tax rate, there is a corresponding 
rise in ത݇, whilst f 1(τ,0) remains unchanged. We can obtain the impact of τ on ݇ு∗  from 
Equation (26), as follows: 
݇ு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ െ ሺ1 െ ߛ ൅ ߛ߬ሻߦሺ݇ு
∗ ሻଵାఈ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሼ1 െ ߙ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙߛሻ߬ߦሺ݇ு∗ ሻఈሽ ൏ 0; 
that is, with an increase in ߬, there is a corresponding reduction in ݇ு∗ . The following 
proposition illustrates how the tax rate affects the law of motion of capital per worker. 
Proposition 2.  In an economy with child allowances, an increase in the tax rate will 
result in a downward rotation of the locus of the law of motion of 
capital per worker if Assumption 1 holds. 
Proof:  See Appendix C. 
We first consider the case when ݇௧ ൒ ത݇. In this case, only skilled workers exist 
in the economy. As demonstrated in the Proposition 1, an increase in the tax rate will 
raise the average fertility, while also reducing the after-tax income and savings for 
skilled workers. Both effects will lead to a reduction in capital per worker, and as 
such, an increase in the tax rate will lead to a downward shift of the locus of ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ. 
In the case where ݇௧ ൏ ത݇ , a higher tax rate will directly reduce the after-tax 
income for skilled workers. However, the lower ratio of the population of skilled 
adults to the adult population implies an increase in the wage rate for skilled workers. 
Savings for skilled workers will remain unchanged since the positive and negative 
effects caused by the increase in the tax rate will cancel each other out, and the 
aggregate savings for the economy as a whole will be reduced as a results of the lower 
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߶௧.10 Thus, in conjunction with the increase in the average fertility, there will be a 
downward rotation of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ.  
Figure 1 presents the locus of the law of motion of capital per worker ݂ሺ߬஺, ݇௧ሻ, 
݂ሺ߬஻, ݇௧ሻ, ݂ሺ߬஼, ݇௧ሻ  and ݂ሺ߬஽, ݇௧ሻ with ߬஺ ൏ ߬஻ ൏ ߬஼ ൏ ߬஽. The parameterization in 
Figure 1 is assumed to satisfy the conditions that ݂൫߬, ത݇൯ ൐ ത݇ and ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൐ ݇௧ for all 
݇௧ ൏ ത݇ when ߬ equals 0 and ݂൫߬, ത݇൯ ൏ ത݇ when ߬ is close to 1. We begin our analysis 
by considering the dynamic transition of an economy with a low tax rate (߬஺). Under 
this scenario, the economy will converge to ݇ு∗ ሺ߬஺ሻ regardless of where it starts from. 
Once when the tax rate exceeds ߬஻, club convergence will begin to occur. When the 
tax rate reaches ߬஼, multiple stable non-trivial steady states will exist. If the initial 
level of capital per worker in the economy is sufficiently large, then the economy will 
be able to converge to ݇ு∗ ሺ߬஼ሻ; however, those economies that are particularly poor, 
and those which start from low initial values of capital per worker, will be stuck in 
poverty (݇௅∗ሺ߬஼ሻሻ. Under a scenario where the tax rate is sufficiently large (such as ߬஽), 
the economy will be trapped in the underdevelopment state ݇௅∗ሺ߬஽ሻ.  
4.  EDUCATIONAL SUSIDIES 
We now go on to consider an economy where the government provides educational 
subsidies; that is, ߜ ൌ 0. Recall that such subsidies are proportional to the wage loss 
due to schooling; that is, ܧ௧ ൌ ݃ߪݓ௧௦ , where ݃ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. Since government runs a 
balanced budget and only skilled workers pay for tax, this implies that ݃ ൌ ߬. 
The optimal choices for skilled workers are affected by the educational subsidies 
and become: 
																																																															ݖ௧௦ ൌ ߛሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ,																																																ሺ28ሻ 
                                                 
10   Based on Eqs. (9), (12) and (13), we can derive the savings for skilled workers as ݏ௧௦ ൌሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦ݇௧ఈ߶௧ି ఈ. Substituting Eq. (19) into the saving function, we have ݏ௧௦ ൌ ܣߚܾሺ1 െ ߪሻ
షം
ഁ /ሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ, 
which is independent of the tax rate. 
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																																																											ܽ௧௦ ൌ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻݓ௧
௦
ߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ .																																								ሺ29ሻ 
The optimal decisions for unskilled workers are the same as those in Eqs. (15) 
and (16). In order to guarantee that ݖ௧௦ ൏ ݖ௧௨, we assume ߬ ൏ ఙሺఊାఉሻఉ  in an economy 
with educational subsidies. The free mobility between being skilled unskilled workers 
implies that the ratio of the wage rate of unskilled workers to that of skilled workers is: 
																																															߭௧ ൌ ݓ௧
௨
ݓ௧௦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ቈ
ሺ1 െ ߪሻሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ
ߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ቉
ଵାఊఉ .																								ሺ30ሻ 
Combining Eqs. (12) and (30), we can express the ratio of skilled workers to the 
adult population, in terms of ߬ and  ݇௧: 
                                              ߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧,																																																					ሺ31ሻ 
where ߤሺ߬ሻ ൌ ଵఉ ൥
ଵିఈ
௕ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻଵିఈሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ
ଵାംഁ ቂ ଵିఙఊାఉሺଵିఛሻቃ
ଵିఈାംഁ൩
భ
ഀ
. Notice that ߤ′ሺ߬ሻ ൌ
ఊሺఈିఛሻఓሺఛሻ
ఈሺଵିఛሻሾఊାఉሺଵିఛሻሿ>0. 
We use ෨݇  to represent the value that ߶൫߬, ෨݇൯ ൌ 1. Based on Eq. (31), we can then 
calculate that: 
෨݇ሺ߬ሻ ൌ 1ߤሺ߬ሻ	. 
Since ߤᇱሺ߬ሻ ൐ 0, we have that ෨݇ሺ߬ሻ is a decreasing function in ߬.  
Therefore, we have: 
                              				߶ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ቊߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧1 					if				
݇௧ ൏ ෨݇	
݇௧ ൒ ෨݇	.                                     (32) 
Using Eq. (32), the average fertility rate of the economy is derived as: 
																				݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓݍ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧൨
ݍ ቈ ߛሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ቉
ఊ 					if					݇௧ ൏ ෨݇	݇௧ ൒ ෨݇	,																												ሺ33ሻ 
where ߞሺ߬ሻ ൌ ቀ ఊఊାఉቁ
ఊ െ ቂ ఊሺଵିఙሻఊାఉሺଵିఛሻቃ
ఊ
൐ 0 and ߞᇱሺ߬ሻ ൏ 0. Note that ݍζሺ߬ሻ measures the 
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fertility difference between unskilled and skilled workers. Using Eq. (33), we can 
state the following proposition with regard to the impact of the tax rate on the average 
fertility rate.  
Proposition 3.  In an economy with educational subsidies and ߬ ൏ min ቄߙ, ఙሺఊାఉሻఉ ቅ, 
an increase in the tax rate will raise the average fertility rate of the 
economy, provided that the fertility difference between unskilled 
and skilled workers is not too large; that is, ζሺ߬ሻ ൏ ζሺ߬ሻ ൌ
ఈఉఊሺଵିఙሻሺଵିఛሻ
ሾఊାఉሺଵିఛሻሿሺఈିఛሻ. 
Proof:   See Appendix D. 
If ݇௧ ൏ ෨݇	 , an increase in the tax rate will raise the amount of educational 
subsidies and the motivation of being skilled workers. However, a higher tax rate on 
skilled workers’ income lowers the motivation of being skilled workers. If the tax rate 
is low enough (߬ ൏ ߙ), the former effect will dominate the latter, and there will be an 
increase in the ratio of the population of skilled workers to the adult population. Eq. 
(28) indicates that an increase in the tax rate will also raise the fertility rate for skilled 
workers since it reduces the opportunity cost of raising children, with a resultant 
increase in the average fertility. Conversely, an increase in the ratio of skilled workers 
to the total population will lower the average fertility because the fertility rate of 
skilled workers is lower than that of unskilled workers. The average fertility is 
therefore will increase if the fertility difference between unskilled and skilled workers 
is not too large. If ݇௧ ൒ ෨݇	, with an increase in the tax rate, there will an increase in 
the fertility rate of skilled workers, while the ratio of the population of skilled workers 
to the adult population will remain equal to 1.  
Note that ζሺ߬ሻ is a decreasing function in ߬ while ζሺ߬ሻ is an increasing function 
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in ߬ . The condition that ζሺ߬ሻ ൏ ζሺ߬ሻ  will be satisfied if ߬ ൐ ߬̃ , where ߬̃  satisfies 
ζሺ߬̃ሻ ൏ ζሺ߬̃ሻ. In order to facilitate our analysis of the effects of educational subsidies, 
instead of Assumption 1, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 2. In an economy with educational subsidies, we assume that ߬ ∈
ቀ߬̃,min ቄߙ, ఙሺఊାఉሻఉ ቅቁ, where ߬̃ satisfies ζሺ߬̃ሻ ൌ
ఈఉሺଵିఛ෤ሻ
ሺఈିఛሻ ቂ
ఊሺଵିఙሻ
ఊାఉሺଵିఛ෤ሻቃ
ఊ
. 
4.1  Dynamics 
The law of motion of capital per worker within the economy can be expressed as: 
												݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܣ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߚߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൨
ଵିఈ
݇௧ఈ߶௧ଵିఈ ൅ ߚܾߛ ൅ ߚ ሺ1 െ ߶௧ሻ
݉௧ 	.									ሺ34ሻ 
Using Eqs. (32) and (33) to substitute ߶௧ and ݉௧ in Eq. (34), we can derive the 
law of motion of capital per worker as: 
                             ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ቊ ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ					if				
݇௧ ൏ ෨݇	
݇௧ ൒ ෨݇	,                       (35) 
where 
				݃ଵሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ ܣ
ቊሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ߤሺ߬ሻ൨
ଵିఈ
െ ߚܾߤሺ߬ሻߛ ൅ ߚ ቋ ݇௧ ൅
ߚܾ
ߛ ൅ ߚ
ݍ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧൨
	.				ሺ36ሻ 
and 
																												݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൌ
ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߚߛ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚ ൨
ଵିఈ
݇௧ఈ
ݍ ൤ ߛሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ൨
ఊ 	.																													ሺ37ሻ 
Besides, we also have: 
																												݃ଵሺ߬, 0ሻ ൌ ܣߚܾݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ൐ 0,					 lim௞೟→ஶ
߲݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲݇௧ ൌ 0.																	ሺ38ሻ 
In Appendix E, we show that ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is convex in ݇௧ and ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is a concave 
function in ݇௧. Together with Eq. (38), this implies the existence of a steady state. 
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There are, at most, three steady states which are referred to as ݇௅#, ݇ெ#  and ݇ு# , where 
݇௅# and ݇ெ#  are the solutions for ݇# ൌ ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇#ሻ and ݇ு#  is the non-trivial solution for 
݇# ൌ ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇#ሻ and with ݇௅# ൏ ݇ெ# ൏ ݇ு# . Since the locus of ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is similar to the 
locus of ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, our analysis on the dynamic behavior of the economy under taken in 
the previous section can be also applied here. 
4.2  Effects of educational subsidies 
In order to examine the effects of the tax rate, we first derive the impact of ߬ on ݇ு#  
using Eq. (37): 
݇ு#ᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݇ு
#
1 െ ߙ ൞
ζᇱሺ߬ሻ
൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ζሺ߬ሻ
െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሿൢ ൏ 0. 
Thus, an increase in ߬ there will reduce ݇ு∗ . The following proposition explains the 
way in which the tax rate affects the law of motion of capital per worker. 
Proposition 4.  In an economy with educational subsidies, an increase in the tax 
rate will cause a downward rotation of the law of motion of capital per worker if 
Assumption 2 holds. 
Proof:  See Appendix E. 
As indicated earlier in Proposition 3, with an increase in the tax rate, there will 
be a corresponding increase in the average fertility rate, and together with the lower 
after-tax income and savings for skilled workers, this will reduce the overall capital 
per worker. Therefore, if ݇௧ ൒ ෨݇	, an increase in the tax rate will cause a downward 
shift of the locus of the capital per worker. 
If ݇௧ ൏ ෨݇	, an increase in the tax rate will induce a higher ratio of skilled adults to 
the total adults population, which in turn, will lower the wage rate for skilled workers. 
Therefore, savings for skilled workers will decrease. Although an increase in the ratio 
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of skilled adults to the total adults population is beneficial to the capital accumulation 
since skilled workers will save more than unskilled workers, this effect is not 
sufficiently large to offset the negative effect on the capital accumulation caused by 
the reduced savings of skilled workers. Hence, the aggregate savings for the economy 
will be reduced. Together with an increase in the average fertility, a higher tax rate 
will induce a downward rotation of the law of motion of capital per worker.  
Figure 2 presents the economic dynamics under four tax rates with ߬஺ ൏ ߬஻ ൏
߬஼ ൏ ߬஽. We assume that the parameterization in Figure 2 satisfies the conditions that 
݃൫߬, ෨݇൯ ൐ ෨݇  and ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ൐ ݇௧  for all ݇௧ ൏ ෨݇  when ߬ equals 0 and ݃൫߬, ෨݇൯ ൏ ෨݇  when 
߬ is close to 1. Since the impact of the tax rate on the dynamic performance in an 
economy with educational subsidies is similar to that of an economy with child 
allowances, the results in Proposition 3 can also be applied here. Note that under 
educational subsidies, ෨݇  is reduced with the tax rate, while under child allowances, ݇ 
is increased with the tax rate. 
<Figure 2 is inserted about here> 
5.  DISCUSSION 
In this section, we consider two possible extensions of our model: technological 
progress and social welfare. We first summarize our findings and a summary of the 
effects of the tax rate on the macroeconomic variables, based on the two alternative 
policies, is provided in Table 1. A comparison of the two policies reveals that the tax 
rate has quite diverse effects on the ratio of the population of skilled workers to the 
adult population, although it does have similar effects on both the average fertility rate 
and capital accumulation. With an increase in the tax rate, the ratio of the population 
of skilled workers to the adult population increases under child allowances decreases 
while it increases under educational subsidies.  
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<Table 1 is inserted about here> 
Before ߶௧  reaches 1, with an increase in the tax rate, the average fertility will 
increase due to the increases in fertility rates for both skilled and unskilled workers as 
well as the increase in the population of unskilled workers under the policy of child 
allowances. However, under educational subsidies, the increase in the average fertility 
rate is mainly attributable to the increase in the fertility rate of skilled workers. Under 
both policies, higher average fertility rates will reduce the capital per worker, thereby 
giving rise to a ‘capital-dilution’ effect.  
As regards savings, savings for both skilled and unskilled workers unchanged 
under a policy of child allowances. The national savings will be reduced, essentially 
as a result of the reduction in the ratio of skilled workers to the total population. 
However, under educational subsidies, with an increase in the tax rate, the national 
savings would be reduced as a result of the reduced savings of skilled workers.  
When ߶௧ reaches 1, an increase in the tax rate will cause the same effects on 
fertility and savings under both policies. The fertility rate will increase while the 
savings will decrease with the tax rate. 
5.1  Technological progress 
In the absence of technological progress, a country trapped in a low output, low 
educational attainment equilibrium would remain there forever. As demonstrated by 
Azariadis and Drazen (1990), one explanation for the phenomenon of non-convergent 
long-run growth paths within the extant economic growth literature is the ‘threshold’ 
property of technological externalities. We therefore go on to introduce this feature 
into our analysis by assuming that total factor productivity (A) is dependent upon 
capital per worker: 
                                           ܣሺ݇௧ሻ ൌ ቊܣܣ					if				
݇௧ ൏ ෠݇	
݇௧ ൒ ෠݇	.                                 
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We consider an economy where child allowances are provided and the tax rate is 
set at τC, as illustrated in Figure 3, with Figure 3(i) illustrating a low-threshold 
scenario, such that ෠݇ ൏ ݇௅∗൫ܣ, ߬஼൯ ൏ ݇ሺܣ, ߬஼ሻ. All economies begin with a low initial 
level of capital per worker ( ݇଴ ൏ ෠݇ ), and initially converge towards ෠݇  along 
ଵ݂൫ܣ, ߬, ݇௧൯; such economies would then jump to ଵ݂൫ܣ, ߬, ݇௧൯  and on reaching the 
threshold ݇#, would converge to a high steady state level, ݇ு∗ ሺܣ, ߬஼ሻ. 
However, club convergence may still occur if the threshold is not sufficiently 
low, such as the case where ݇௅∗൫	ܣ, ߬஼൯ ൏ ෠݇ ൏ ݇൫ܣ, ߬஼൯, as illustrated in Figure 3(ii). 
Under this scenario, initial value is of relevance. If ݇଴ ൏ ෠݇, then the economy would 
converge to the underdevelopment trap (݇௅∗൫	ܣ, ߬஼൯); however, if  ݇଴ ൒ ෠݇ , then the 
economy would converge to a high steady state level, ݇ு∗ ሺܣ, ߬஼ሻ. 
<Figure 3 is inserted about here> 
5.2  Welfare 
Finally, we examine the effects of the introduction of these two policies on welfare. 
The social welfare is defined by the representative adult’s steady-state lifetime utility. 
Because these two policies are more common in developed countries than in 
developing countries, we focus our analysis on the effects for developed countries. 
Therefore, the welfare is defined at the high steady state (݇ு∗ ); that is: 
                                                  ݑு∗ ൌ ln݊ு∗ ൅ ߚlnܿு∗ , 
where ݊ு∗  and ܿு∗  are the steady-state fertility and consumption of skilled workers at 
݇ு∗ , respectively. 
With an introduction of child allowances, government levies income tax and the 
steady-state fertility and consumption of skilled workers are ݊ு∗ ൌ ݍ ቂఊሺଵିఙሻఊାఉ ቃ
ఊ ሾ1 ൅
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߬ߦሺ݇ு∗ ሻఈሿଵିఊ  and ܿு∗ ൌ ܣଶߙሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ቂሺଵିఙሻఉఊାఉ ቃ
ଶሺଵିఈሻ ሺ݇ு∗ ሻଶఈିଵ . Taking the 
derivative of ݑு∗  with respect to ߬, we can obtain: 
ݑு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߦ
ሾሺ݇ு∗ ሻఈ ൅ ߬ߙሺ݇ு∗ ሻఈିଵ݇ு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻሿ
1 ൅ ߬ߦሺ݇ு∗ ሻఈ ൅ ߚ ቈ
െ1
1 െ ߬ ൅
ሺ2ߙ െ 1ሻ݇ு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ
݇ு∗ ቉ . ሺ39ሻ 
Evaluating Eq. (39) at ߬ ൌ 0, we have: 
														ݑு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ 0 ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቈ1 ൅ ߚ
ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻ
1 െ ߙ ቉൞
ߦଵఈ
ݍ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛߛ ൅ ߚ ൨
ఊൢ
ఈ
ଵିఈ
െ β.														ሺ40ሻ 
Eq. (40) indicates that ݑு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ will be positive if ݍ is sufficiently small and vice versa. 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
Proposition 5.  For developed countries, an introduction of child allowances will 
improve (hurt) welfare if ݍ is sufficiently small (large). 
An introduction of child allowances will raise fertility rate which will be 
beneficial to welfare. However, an increase in the population growth will cause a 
‘capital-dilution’ effect which will lower ݇ு∗  and ܿு∗ . This effect will in turn reduce 
welfare. If ݍ is sufficiently small, the former will dominate the latter and introducing 
of child allowances will improve welfare. However, the situation will be reversed if ݍ 
is sufficiently large. 
On the other hand, if the government introduces educational subsidies, the 
steady-state fertility and consumption of skilled workers are ݊ு∗ ൌ ݍ ቂ ఊሺଵିఙሻఊାఉሺଵିఛሻቃ
ఊ
 and 
ܿு∗ ൌ ܣଶߙሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቂሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఙሻఉఊାఉሺଵିఛሻ ቃ
ଶሺଵିఈሻ ሺ݇ு∗ ሻଶఈିଵ . Taking the derivative of ݑு∗  with 
respect to ߬, we can obtain: 
																ݑு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ ߚሾߛ ൅ 2ߚሺ1 െ ߙሻሿߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ െ
2ߚሺ1 െ ߙሻ
1 െ ߬ െ
ߚሺ1 െ 2ߙሻ݇ு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ
݇ு∗ .															ሺ41ሻ 
Evaluating Eq. (41) at ߬ ൌ 0, we have: 
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ݑு∗ ᇱሺ߬ሻ 0 ൌ ߚ
ଶߛሺ1 െ 2ߙሻ
ሺߛ ൅ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐ 0. 
We then obtain the following result. 
Proposition 6.  For developed countries, an introduction of educational subsidies 
will improve welfare. 
Similar to the introduction of child allowances, introducing educational subsidies 
will improve welfare by raising fertility; however, it will also reduce welfare by 
generating the ‘capital-dilution’ effect. The former always dominates the latter so that 
this policy is welfare improving. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our primary aim in this study is to examine the impacts of child allowances and 
educational subsidies on economic growth based on an overlapping-generations 
model, analyzing the effects of these two policies on fertility and the proportion of 
skilled workers to the adult population. The provision of child allowances and 
educational subsidies is financed by levying income tax on skilled workers; the 
production function is assumed to exhibit the complementarity of capital and skills; 
and agents are allowed to make decisions on consumption, savings and personal 
investment in higher education. 
We demonstrate that these two policy provisions may result in countries being 
trapped in underdevelopment and that the tax rate is an important determinant of long-
run economic growth. If the tax rate is sufficiently high, the economy will converge to 
a steady state with a low proportion of high skilled workers to the adult population, as 
well as low output per worker. With a reduction in the tax rate, club convergence may 
occur; thus, the initial condition is of relevance. Only when the tax rate is sufficiently 
low will the economy converge to a ‘good’ steady state, regardless of its initial 
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condition. The threshold effect of technological externalities can prevent the economy 
from becoming trapped in poverty, provided that the threshold was sufficiently low; 
under such a scenario, there would be a unique, stable and ‘good’ steady state. 
However, if the threshold was not sufficiently low, then club convergence would still 
occur. These two policies will affect welfare differently. While an introduction of 
educational subsidies is always welfare improving, an introduction of child 
allowances may improve or hurt welfare. 
As regards the effects on the future tax burden, our results demonstrate that both 
child allowances and educational subsidies can be used as a means of raising fertility, 
and hence, the population growth rate; the increase in the population growth rate will 
increase the tax base, thereby mitigating the future tax burden. However, our analysis 
also shows that in order to mitigate the future tax burden, the government needs to 
raise the current tax burden, which may result in the economy becoming stuck in the 
poverty trap.  
The focus of this paper has been on the effects of these two policies on economic 
growth, not on social welfare, which is invariably the focus in the prior studies; thus, 
as an extension of this research, it may prove interesting to include intra-general 
transfer mechanisms, such as social security systems, within our model, in order to 
study the optimal allocation of tax revenue. 
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Table 1 The effects of an increase in the tax rate 
 Child Allowances Educational Subsidies 
Panel A: ݇௧ ൏ ത݇ 
߶௧ ↓ ↑ 
ݖ௧௦ → ↑ 
ݖ௧௨ → → 
݊௧௦ ↑ ↑ 
݊௧௨ ↑ → 
݉௧ ↑ ↑ 
ܿ௧௦ ↓ ↓ 
ܿ௧௨ ↓ ↓ 
ܽ௧௦ → ↓ 
ܽ௧௨ → → 
݇/ ෨݇  ↑ ↓ 
ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ/	 ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ↓ ↓ 
Panel B: ݇௧ ൒ ത݇ (߶௧ ൌ 1) 
ݖ௧௦ → ↑ 
݊௧௦ ↑ ↑ 
ܿ௧௦ ↓ ↓ 
ܽ௧௦ ↓ ↓ 
ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ/	݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ ↓ ↓ 
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Figure 2  The effects of tax rate on the dynamic systems of capital per worker  
under a policy of  educational subsidies 
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Figure 3  Dynamic system of capital per worker when  
(i) ෠݇ ൏ ݇௅∗൫ܣ, ߬஼൯, and (ii) ݇௅∗൫ ܣ, ߬஼൯ ൏ ෠݇ ൏ ݇൫ܣ, ߬஼൯ 
kt
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APPENDIX A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Using Eq. (21) to differentiate ݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ with respect to ߬, we obtain that if ݇௧ ൒ ത݇ , 
then: 
∂݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ
ݍ ൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
ሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿିఊ݇௧
ߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻ  
ൈ ቄሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ ቀߙ െ ߬߬ ቁ ሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿ ൅ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻ
ଵିఈ݇௧ሿቅ. 
Therefore, ப௠ሺఛ,௞೟ሻபఛ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൐ ߬. 
If ݇௧ ൒ ത݇, then: 
∂݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ ݍߠߦ݇௧
ఈሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻିఊ ൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
ሺ1 െ ߪሻఊ ൐ 0. 
QED.  
 
APPENDIX B 
Locus of ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ 
From Eq. (25), the first partial derivative of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ݇௧, is: 
																																߲ ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ߲݇௧ ൌ
ܣߚܾ
ݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ሺߡଵ ൅ ߡଶ݇௧ ൅ ߡଷ݇௧ଶሻ
ሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿଶିఊሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿଶ 	,																		ሺB1ሻ 
where  
ߡଵ ൌ ߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ ሺ1 െ ߪሻఊ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈ൨ ; 
ߡଶ ൌ 	߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ ൜ߛߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ 1൨ ൅ ሺ2 െ ߛሻߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻൠ ൐ 0; 
ߡଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ 1൨ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଷିఈߪ෤ ൐ 0. 
Note that ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
షം
ഁ ൐ 1  and ሺ1 െ ߪሻఊ ൏ 1 . Moreover, we can rewrite ߡଵ as ߡଵ ൌ
ߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
షം
ഁ െ 1 ൅ ߪ෤ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈ൨. Under Assumption 1, ߪ෤ ൐ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈ ൐
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ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈ; we therefore have ߡଵ ൐ 0 and ப௙భሺఛ,௞೟ሻப௞೟ ൐ 0. 
The second partial derivative of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ݇௧, can be calculated as: 
																					∂
ଶ ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂݇௧ଶ ൌ
ܣߚܾ
ݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ሺߡସ ൅ ߡହ݇௧ ൅ ߡ଺݇௧ଶ ൅ ߡ଻݇௧ଷሻ
ሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿଷିఊሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿଷ 	,																			ሺB2ሻ 
where 
ߡସ ൌ ߡଶ ൅ ߟሺ߬ሻሾ2ߪ෤ െ ሺ2 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈሿߡଵ; 
ߡହ ൌ 2ߡଷ ൅ ߡଶߟሺ߬ሻሾߪ෤ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻିఈሿ ൅ ߡଵሺ4 െ ߛሻߪ෤߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଶିఈ; 
ߡ଺ ൌ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈሾߡଷߛ ൅ ߡଶሺ3 െ ߛሻߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻሿ ൐ 0; 
ߡ଻ ൌ ߡଷሺ2 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଶିఈߪ෤ ൐ 0. 
Under our Assumption 1, ߡସ ൐ 0  and ߡହ ൐ 0 , which implies that ப
మ௙భሺఛ,௞೟ሻ
ப௞೟మ ൐ 0 . 
Therefore, ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ  is convex in ݇௧. 
Using Eq. (26), we can obtain that the first and second partial derivatives of 
ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ݇௧, are as follows: 
																																	߲ ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ߲݇௧ ൌ
ߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦ݇௧ఈିଵሾ1 ൅ ߛ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሿ
ݍ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛߛ ൅ ߚ ൨
ఊ
ሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻଶିఊ
൐ 0.																							ሺB3ሻ	
																																	∂
ଶ ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂݇௧ଶ ൌ
െሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦߡ଼݇௧ఈିଶ
ݍ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛߛ ൅ ߚ ൨
ఊ
ሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻଷିఊ
൏ 0,																						ሺB4ሻ	 
where 
ߡ଼ ൌ ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൅ ߬ߦߙ݇௧ఈሾ1 ൅ ߙ ൅ ߛ െ 3ߙߛ ൅ ߬ߦߛሺ1 െ ߙߛሻሻ݇௧ఈሿ ൐ 0. 
Therefore, ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is a concave function in ݇௧. 
 
APPENDIX C 
Proof of Proposition 2  
When ݇௧ ൏ ത݇, the partial derivative of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ߬, is: 
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∂ ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ
െ ܣߚܾ݇௧ߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻଵିఊߛఊ ሺߡଽ ൅ ߡଵ଴ሻ
ሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿଶିఊሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿଶ ൏ 0, 
where  
ߡଽ ൌ ߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ ሺ1 െ ߪሻఊ൨ ሾ1 ൅ ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ݇௧ሿ ൐ 0;	
ߡଵ଴ ൌ ߙ െ ߬߬ ൜1 ൅ ߟሺ߬ሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ିఊ
ఉ െ 1൨ ݇௧ൠ ሾ1 െ ߪ෤ߟሺ߬ሻ݇௧ሿሺ1 െ ߛሻ߬ߦߟሺ߬ሻଵିఈ ൐ 0. 
When ݇௧ ൒ ത݇, the partial derivative of ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ߬, is:  
∂ ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ െ
ߦ݇௧ఈሼ1 ൅ ߦ݇௧ఈሾ߬ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߛሻሿሽ
ݍ ൤ሺ1 െ ߪሻߛߛ ൅ ߚ ൨
ఊ
ሺ1 ൅ ߬ߦ݇௧ఈሻଶିఊ
൏ 0. 
Therefore, an increase in ߬ will lower the locus of ଵ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ and ଶ݂ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ. 
QED. 
 
APPENDIX D 
Proof of Proposition 3 
First note that: 
ߤᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ ߛሺߙ െ ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሿ, 
which implies that ߤᇱሺ߬ሻ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൐ ߬ and vice versa. Besides, we can also derive that 
ߞᇱሺ߬ሻ ൌ െ ߚߛሾߛሺ1 െ ߪሻሿ
ఊ
ሾߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሿଵାఊ ൏ 0 
Using Eq. (33) to differentiate ݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ with respect to ߬, we obtain the results 
that if ݇௧ ൒ ത݇: 
߲݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲߬ ൌ െݍ݇௧ሾߞ
ᇱሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߞሺ߬ሻߤᇱሺ߬ሻሿ 
																																																			ൌ ݍ݇௧ߛߤሺ߬ሻߛ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߚ ቊߚ ൤
ߛሺ1 െ ߪሻ
ߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ൨
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻ ߙ െ ߬ߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻቋ. 
Therefore, ப௠ሺఛ,௞೟ሻபఛ ൐ 0 if ߞሺ߬ሻ ൏
ఈఉሺଵିఛሻ
ሺఈିఛሻ ቂ
ఊሺଵିఙሻ
ఊାఉሺଵିఛሻቃ
ఊ
. 
If ݇௧ ൒ ത݇, then: 
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߲݉ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲߬ ൌ െݍ݇௧ߞ′ሺ߬ሻ ൐ 0. 
QED.  
 
APPENDIX E 
Locus of ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ 
Using Eq. (36), the first partial derivative of ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect to ݇௧, is: 
											߲ ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ߲݇௧ ൌ
ܣߚܾߤሺ߬ሻ
ݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ
൝൤ ߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ൨
ఊ
ఉ െ 1ൡ ൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
൅ ߞሺ߬ሻ
൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧൨
ଶ ,															ሺE1ሻ 
						߲
ଶ ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲݇௧ଶ ൌ
2ܣߚܾߞሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻଶ
ݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ
൝൤ ߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ൨
ఊ
ఉ െ 1ൡ ൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
൅ ߞሺ߬ሻ
൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧൨
ଷ .					ሺE2ሻ 
Since ݖ௧௦ ൏ ݖ௧௨, we have that ଵఊାఉ ൐
ଵିఙ
ఊାఉሺଵିఛሻ, which implies that 
ఊାఉሺଵିఛሻ
ሺଵିఙሻሺఊାఉሻ ൐ 1, 
and hence, ቂ ఊାఉሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఙሻሺఊାఉሻቃ
ം
ഁ ൐ 1. We can then obtain that ப௚భሺఛ,௞೟ሻப௞೟ ൐ 0 and 	
பమ௚భሺఛ,௞೟ሻ
ப௞೟మ ൐ 0. 
Therefore, ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ  is convex in ݇௧,. 
Using Eq. (37), the first and second partial derivatives of ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ, with respect 
to ݇௧, are as follows: 
																			߲݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ߲݇௧ ൌ
ܣߙሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൨
ଵିఈ
݇௧ఈିଵ
ݍ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻ൨
൐ 0.													ሺE3ሻ	
											߲
ଶ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
߲݇௧ଶ ൌ
െܣߙሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ ൤ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൨
ଵିఈ
݇௧ఈିଶ
ݍ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ߞሺ߬ሻ൨
൏ 0.															ሺE4ሻ 
Therefore, ݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ is a concave function in ݇௧. 
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APPENDIX F 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Using Eq. (36), we can calculate: 
∂ ଵ݃ሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ
ܣߚܾ݇௧
ݍሺߛ ൅ ߚሻ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ζሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧൨
൞ߡଵଵ ൅ ߡଵଶߡଵଷ
൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ζሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ݇௧
ൢ, 
where  
ߡଵଵ ൌ െ
ఊఓሺఛሻ൝ఛሺଵିఈሻቂ ംశഁሺభషഓሻሺభష഑ሻሺംశഁሻቃ
ം
ഁାሺఈିఛሻൡ
ሾఊାሺଵିఛሻఉሿఈሺଵିఛሻ ൏ 0;  
 ߡଵଶ ൌ 1 ൅ ߤሺ߬ሻ ቊቂ ఊାఉሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఙሻሺఊାఉሻቃ
ം
ഁ െ 1ቋ ݇௧ ൐ 0; 
 ߡଵଷ ൌ ߞᇱሺ߬ሻߤሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߞሺ߬ሻߤᇱሺ߬ሻ ൏ 0. 
Therefore, we have ப௚భሺఛ,௞೟ሻபఛ ൏ 0. 
Using Eq. (37), we can obtain: 
∂݃ଶሺ߬, ݇௧ሻ
∂߬ ൌ
ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߪሻߛ ൅ ߚሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൨
ଵିఈ
݇௧ఈ
ݍ ൤൬ ߛߛ ൅ ߚ൰
ఊ
െ ζሺ߬ሻ൨
ߡଵସ, 
where ߡଵସ ൌ ஖
ᇲሺఛሻ
ቀ ംംశഁቁ
ംି஖ሺఛሻ
െ ሺଵିఈሻఊሺଵିఛሻሾఊାఉሺଵିఛሻሿ ൏ 0. Thus, we have 
ப௚మሺఛ,௞೟ሻ
பఛ ൏ 0. 
QED. 
 
